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ROBUST APPELLATE REVIEW OF
SENTENCES: JUST HOW BRITISH IS
INDIANA?
RANDALL T. SHEPARD*
While the notion of appealability of sentences is widespread, such appeals
in most jurisdictions occur under standards like ―abuse of discretion‖ or ―plain
error‖ or simply ―excessive.‖ In the late 1960s, Indiana began the process of
importing into its constitutional law a piece of British doctrine that
contemplates a more robust role for appellate courts. For two decades, this
appeared to produce little if any difference in outcomes. In the first decade of
the new century, however, a series of rule changes has prompted movement
toward the original design.
I. A MODERN BRITISH IMPORT
The typical approach to sentencing appeals in the nation‘s state courts
permits modification of sentences only where the trial court has abused its
discretion or a computational error occurred below. 1 For most of Indiana‘s
history, the state limited appellate courts to these sorts of tasks. Nearly forty
years ago, substantial amendments to the Indiana Constitution conferred upon
the Indiana Supreme Court ―the power to review all questions of law and to
review and revise the sentence imposed.‖ 2
Section 4 was part of
constitutional alterations ratified by the voters in 1970, to become effective in
1972, as part of the rewritten judicial article. The new judicial article resulted
from efforts of the Judicial Study Commission, created by the Indiana General
Assembly to study the needs of the state for reform of the judicial system, to
continuously survey and study the judicial system‘s operation, and to submit
suggestions or recommendations for changes to the judicial branch. 3 ―The
Commission‘s work on the revised Article began in 1965 and culminated with
its 1966 proposal of the new judicial article.‖4
At an early meeting of the Judicial Study Commission, the Commission‘s
chair recommended that the project ought to ―[s]tart with the model article,‖
* Chief Justice of Indiana. A.B., Princeton University, 1969; J.D., Yale Law School, 1972;
LL.M., University of Virginia Law School, 1995.
1. 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 786 (2007).
2. IND. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
3. Act of Mar. 3, 1965, ch. 47, 1965 Ind. Acts 75–77.
4. McCullough v. State, 900 N.E.2d 745, 747 (Ind. 2009).
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an apparent reference to the 1962 Model Judicial Article of the American Bar
Association (ABA).5 Two related sections of the ABA model article granted
appellate power ―to review and revise the sentence imposed.‖ 6 The structural
language of the Indiana Commission‘s eventual proposal mirrored Section 3
of the ABA version, authorizing the court of appeals to ―exercise appellate
jurisdiction under such terms and conditions as the Supreme Court shall
specify by rules‖ that include the authority to review and revise sentences in
criminal cases.7 Moreover, the Indiana Commission‘s commentary to its
proposed Section 4 employed precisely the same language used by the ABA
explaining its model provision. The ABA explained: ―The proposal that the
appellate power in criminal cases include the power to review sentences is
based on the efficacious use to which that power has been put by the Court of
Criminal Appeals in England.‖8 This ABA language was utilized in its
entirety by the Commission in its report, and it represents the only
commentary explaining the grant of the power to review and revise. In
placing the matter before the voters for ratification, the Indiana legislature
endorsed the Commission‘s report as constituting official legislative history. 9
At the time the ABA and the Indiana Commission were engaged in
drafting, the English statute establishing the court of appeal, criminal division,
set forth that court‘s power to review and revise sentences as follows:
On an appeal against sentence the Court of Criminal Appeal
shall, if they think that a different sentence should have been
passed, quash the sentence passed at the trial, and pass such
other sentence warranted in law by the verdict (whether more or
less severe) in substitution therefor as they think ought to have
been passed, and in any other case shall dismiss the appeal.10
An observer of the British system as it had developed up through the time
of Indiana‘s constitutional change concluded that, quite aside from correcting

5. Id. at 748 (quoting Minutes from a Meeting of the Indiana Judicial Study Commission 2
(May 17, 1966)).
6. MODEL STATE JUDICIAL ARTICLE §§ 2(2)(B), 3 (1962), reprinted in Ivan Lee Holt, Jr., The
Model State Judicial Article in Perspective, 47 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC‘Y 6, 9 (1963), quoted in
McCullough, 900 N.E.2d at 748.
7. Compare MODEL STATE JUDICIAL ARTICLE § 3 with IND. JUDICIAL STUDY COMM ‘N,
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL STUDY COMMISSION 141 (1966).
8. MODEL STATE JUDICIAL ARTICLE, supra note 6, § 2(2)(B) cmt.
9. In the Joint Resolution agreeing to the proposed amendment, the General Assemb ly advised
that ―[t]he report of the Judicial Study Commission and the comments to the article contained therein
may be consulted by the Court of Justice to determine the underlying reasons, purposes, and policies
of this article and may be used as a guide in its construction and application.‖ Act of Mar. 10, 1969,
ch. 457, sched., 1969 Ind. Acts 1853. My colleague, Justice Brent Dickson, has recently examined
this history in great detail. See generally McCullough, 900 N.E.2d 745.
10. Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, § 4(3) (Eng.).
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excessive or erroneous individual sentences, the frequent exercise of review
by the court of appeal and the court‘s own broad attitude about its function
had led to the development of policies in general terms, producing a kind of
common law in sentencing. 11 The court developed this common law through
making reference to the basic penal philosophy at work in the high volume of
its decisions, such as when it undertook inquiry about a given offender and
seemingly conflicting goals of ―deterrence or retribution on the one hand and
rehabilitation on the other.‖12
Subsequent to Indiana‘s borrowing of the British formulation, Parliament
engaged in two turnabouts concerning the court‘s authority. In 1968,
Parliament enacted a provision limiting appellate sentence review, providing
that an appellant could not be ―more severely dealt with on appeal than he was
dealt with by the court below.‖13 Two decades later, Parliament reversed
itself, such that present law authorizes the court of appeal, if a criminal
sentence ―has been unduly lenient,‖ to ―pass such sentence as they think
appropriate.‖14
II. IMPLEMENTING THE AUTHORITY
For a number of years after the voters adopted these constitutional
amendments, the state‘s appellate courts conducted sentencing appeals in
much the same way.
An early decision by the Indiana Court of Appeals suggested that the
appellate judges thought nothing had changed. In Wills v. State, the court
said: ―Where, as here, the penalty assessed is in keeping with that prescribed
by the legislature, we cannot interfere. We cannot rewrite the statute nor
absent an abuse of discretion substitute what we deem to be a more equitable
penalty.‖15 In Beard v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court announced that it
would not exercise the power granted under Section 4 until a program of
policies and procedures governing this authority could be established. 16 There
followed a series of cases in which both appellate courts simply declined to
employ the revising power. The supreme court declined to review sentences,
saying such power could not ―be rationally exercised until the Court has
developed procedures for its use.‖17 The court sometimes used stronger

11. D.A. Thomas, Appellate Review of Sentences and the Development of Sentencing Policy:
The English Experience, 20 ALA. L. REV. 193, 217–18 (1968).
12. Id. at 204.
13. Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c.19, § 11(3) (Eng.).
14. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 36(1) (Eng.).
15. 318 N.E.2d 385, 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
16. 323 N.E.2d 216, 219 (Ind. 1975).
17. Miller v. State, 364 N.E.2d 129, 132 (Ind. 1977).
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language to describe this decision to reject outright requests to review
sentences under the new grant of constitutional authority, once calling it a
―refusal‖ to act.18
Some seven years after the voters changed the constitution, the supreme
court promulgated the Indiana Rules for the Appellate Review of Sentences.
They took but a single page to print, and the heart of the matter consumed just
two sentences:
(1) The reviewing court will not revise a sentence
authorized by statute except where such sentence is
manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense
and the character of the offender.
(2) A sentence is not manifestly unreasonable unless no
reasonable person could find such sentence appropriate to the
particular offense and offender for which such sentence was
imposed. 19
One respected observer imagined that the adoption of rules might
―encompass a broader approach to sentencing policy under which the
appellate courts will exercise supervisory jurisdiction over the procedure by
which sentences are imposed,‖ in addition to focusing the attention of
reviewing courts on the proportionality of the sentence. 20 This prediction took
a cue from earlier observations by the supreme court itself that the amendment
appeared to go ―beyond that power which this Court has always possessed.‖21
While the adoption of formal rules did not immediately lead to relief for
even a single prisoner, there was counterintuitive movement in death penalty
cases. In contrast to appellate review of prison terms and what turned out to
be a nearly irrebuttable presumption that the trial court‘s sentence was
appropriate, the supreme court came to see its review of capital cases under
Section 4 as part and parcel of the sentencing process. In capital cases, the
court said, the rules on sentence revision ―stand more as guideposts for our
appellate review than as immovable pillars supporting a sentence decision.‖ 22
Rather than relying on the judgment of the trial court, the court began
18. Parker v. State, 358 N.E.2d 110, 114 (Ind. 1976).
19. Order Adopting Rules for the Appellate Review of Sentences—Rule 2 (effective Jan. 1,
1978), in INDIANA CASES: CASES DECIDED IN THE SUPREME COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS:
REPORTED IN THE NORTHEASTERN REPORTER, SECOND SERIES, VOLUME 370, at xxiv–xxv (1977)
(current version of the appellate standard of review is found at IND. R. APP. P. 7(b) (2000) (amended
2002)).
20. J. Eric Smithburn, Sentencing in Indiana: Appellate Review of the Trial Court’s Discretion,
12 VAL. U. L. REV. 219, 231–32 (1978).
21. Parker, 358 N.E.2d at 114.
22. Spranger v. State, 498 N.E.2d 931, 947 n.2 (Ind. 1986).
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embarking on its own review of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances
―to examine whether the sentence of death is appropriate.‖ 23 The object of
this review, the court announced, was to assure ‗―consistency . . . in the
evenhanded operation‘ of the death penalty statute‖ by examining each capital
case in light of earlier ones.24 These doctrinal announcements did not
accompany the grant of any relief to claimants, but they did lay the
groundwork for future reviews where claimants prevailed.
III. A MID-COURSE CORRECTION
Well into the 1980s, it appeared that the constitutional change had not
made much difference in sentencing. Whether the chance for a more
searching appellate review altered local sentencing cannot be known, but the
available evidence is that no appellant prevailed.
In the 1984 case of Cunningham v. State, the court of appeals for the first
time applied the rule on review of sentences to modify a sentence otherwise
authorized by applicable statutes.25 The defendants, a married couple, were
convicted of various charges of theft, conversion, and perjury stemming from
a scheme to obtain food stamps.26 The trial judge sentenced the husband to
consecutive terms totaling sixteen years‘ imprisonment. 27 The court of
appeals concluded that the trial judge had not adequately weighed the
mitigating evidence, and directed that the order for consecutive sentences be
modified to concurrent terms of two years‘ imprisonment. 28 In the course of
its analysis, the Cunningham court said:
We are in as good a position as the trial court to make
these determinations based upon the record before us in a
proper case. All the material available to the trial court at
time of sentencing is equally available to us on appeal. It is
contained in the record. Further, the appellate process is
uniquely suited to dispassionate consideration of the subject
free of the everyday pressures of a trial courtroom. Although
loath to review any sentence imposed by a trial court, we are
constitutionally mandated to do so when, as in this case, it
appears at first blush the sentence imposed was manifestly

23. Schiro v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1047, 1058 (Ind. 1983).
24. Judy v. State, 416 N.E.2d 95, 108 (Ind. 1981) (quoting Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,
259–60 (1976)).
25. 469 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
26. Id. at 4.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 9.
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unreasonable. 29
A fair amount of time passed before the Indiana Supreme Court revised a
sentence. At the very beginning of 1986, it decided Fointno v. State.30
Fointno abducted a woman and her child in a shopping center parking lot and
held them for two hours for various compelled acts of sex. 31 The prosecutor
charged seven separate offenses, and the trial court imposed a sentence of 104
years, roughly twice the sentence for murder. 32 Citing the absence of any
physical injury, the court reduced the sentence to 80 years, hardly a dramatic
revision, over dissenters who called this ―usurping‖ the prerogative of the trial
judge. 33
While revision of prison sentences continued to be extraordinarily rare,
the supreme court subsequently altered sentences in capital cases, citing its
authority to review and revise. In the 1989 case of Martinez Chavez v. State,
a jury had recommended the death penalty for one of two co-perpetrators and
recommended against death for the other.34 The trial judge sentenced both to
death. 35 Reversing the penalty imposed on Martinez Chavez, the supreme
court invoked Section 4 to revise the sentence, saying again that in a capital
case its own rules on revision ―‗stand more as guideposts for our appellate
review than as immovable pillars supporting a sentence decision.‘‖36 In
ordering a term of years, the court highlighted the importance of a jury‘s
recommendation and used the touchstone of appropriateness in a slightly
different way: ―Because reasonable people could differ on the appropriateness
of the death penalty for Martinez Chavez, the trial court should not have
overridden the jury‘s recommendation.‖ 37
Moving farther into new territory, a few months later the supreme court
exercised its revising authority in a case in which a trial court, acting upon a
plea of guilty, imposed the death penalty, Cooper v. State.38 Cooper‘s case
drew international attention because she had been so young when she and
several friends murdered an elderly woman in the woman‘s own home. 39
Focusing on the fact that Cooper‘s penalty for a crime committed at the age of
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
487 N.E.2d 140 (Ind. 1986).
Id. at 143.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 149; id. (Givan, C.J., dissenting).
534 N.E.2d 731, 732 (Ind. 1989).
Id. at 732.
Id. at 733 (quoting Spranger v. State, 498 N.E.2d 931, 947 n.2 (Ind. 1986)).
Id. at 735.
540 N.E.2d 1216, 1217 (Ind. 1989).
Id. at 1217 n.1.
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fifteen had provoked the legislature to alter the state‘s capital punishment
scheme so as to limit death eligibility to perpetrators who were at least sixteen
at the time of the crime, the court said it would be unreasonable for Cooper to
be the only person so executed.40 It ordered a term of years.41
Still, these decisions in capital cases did not lead to very different
appellate outcomes in noncapital cases. In Hardebeck v. State, for example,
the court of appeals declared a sentence of 240 years was not ―manifestly
unreasonable.‖42 Cases like Hardebeck illustrated the near impossibility of
obtaining sentence relief on appeal.
The supreme court made successive rule amendments in subsequent years,
each of them successively less hostile to appellate review. First, effective
March 1, 1997, concluding that the definition that lay at the heart of the
sentencing rules—―no reasonable person could find such sentence
appropriate‖—was altogether too draconian, the court repealed the definition,
leaving only the two-word manifestly unreasonable standard.43 This led one
observer to judge that softening the standard of review had ―the potential for
tremendous impact in criminal appeals.‖44 A year later, it seemed apparent
that this potential had not yet ―come to fruition.‖ 45
Second, effective January 1, 2003, the court altogether abandoned the
manifestly unreasonable standard and restated the standard of review from a
positive formulation that had the structure of a prohibition to one that read
like an authorization to act: ―The Court may revise a sentence authorized by
statute if, after due consideration of the trial court‘s decision, the Court finds
that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender.‖46 The supreme court later characterized these
amendments as ―modest steps to provide more realistic appeal of sentencing
issues.‖47 This objective was not universally applauded, of course, as one
court of appeals judge declared that the reviewing courts should be

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 1219–20.
Id. at 1221.
656 N.E.2d 486, 490–91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
Order Amending Rules of Appellate Procedure—Rules 15, 16, and 17, in INDIANA CASES:
CASES DECIDED IN THE SUPREME COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS: REPORTED IN THE
NORTHEASTERN REPORTER, SECOND SERIES, VOLUMES 672–74, at lxxviii (1997) (effective Mar. 1,
1997) (current version of the appellate standard of review is found at IND. R. APP. P. 7(b) (2000)
(amended July 19, 2002, effective Jan. 1, 2003)).
44. James J. Ammeen, Jr., Developments in Appellate Practice in 1996, 30 IND. L. REV. 1165,
1172 (1997).
45. Michael A. Wilkins & A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Indiana Appellate Procedure in 1997, 31
IND. L. REV. 669, 683–84 (1998).
46. IND. R. APP. P. 7(b).
47. Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852, 856 (Ind. 2003) (revising 385-year sentence for child
molesting to 90 years).
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―maintaining [their] focus on the statutory parameters of sentencing
established by our legislature, rather than second-guessing the trial court.‖48
Those who were keeping careful watch concluded that, though the supreme
court granted sentencing relief several times a year, ―the Indiana Court of
Appeals used its authority to do so more sparingly.‖ 49
IV. A FEW PRISONERS WIN RELIEF, AND PROSECUTORS GAIN A TOOL
Through the end of this decade, prisoners who win sentencing relief are
still few and far between, but revision orders are no longer unheard of. A few
cases selected from the field of child sex crimes illustrates the current
practice.
In Prickett v. State,50 the supreme court found that the trial court‘s
enhancement of Prickett‘s sentences for child molesting convictions was
inappropriate because it resulted from giving too much weight to several of
the aggravating factors the trial judge had cited. 51 The court noted that none
of Prickett‘s prior offenses bore any relation to the crimes with which he was
currently charged; that the record was insufficient to support the conclusion
that he used force; and that, in light of these two factors, his having been on
probation at the time of the offense did not, by itself, warrant the
enhancement.52 Instead, it remanded and ordered Prickett‘s sentence reduced
to the presumptive term of thirty years.53
In Smith v. State, the supreme court reviewed convictions on four counts
of Class A child molesting, each with presumptive sentences of thirty years
ordered to be served consecutively. 54 In its review, the court noted that
Smith‘s prior offenses had occurred ten years before the instant crimes, and it
gave greater weight to his poor mental health than the trial court had. 55 The
supreme court directed that two of the counts should run consecutively and
that the remaining two should run concurrently to those two, effectively
reducing the sentence from 120 years to 60 years.56
48. Bennett v. State, 787 N.E.2d 938, 953 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (Vaidik, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
49. Jon Laramore, Indiana Constitutional Developments: Laches, Sentences, and Privacy, 39
IND. L. REV. 847, 856 (2006).
50. 856 N.E.2d 1203 (Ind. 2006).
51. Prickett was convicted of Class A felony child molesting, for which he was sentenced to
forty years after the presumptive sentence of thirty years was enhanced, and Class C felony child
molesting, for which he was sentenced to eight years after the enhancement of a four-year
presumptive sentence. Id. at 1205–06.
52. Id. at 1209.
53. Id. at 1210–11.
54. 889 N.E.2d 261, 262 (Ind. 2008).
55. Id. at 264.
56. Id. For analogous cases, Smith cited:
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In Schapker v. State, the court of appeals found that Schapker‘s guilty plea
was entitled to mitigating weight, but it endorsed the trial court‘s conclusion
that committing the offense in the presence of other children was an
aggravating circumstance, as was the extremely young age of the victim. 57
The court acknowledged Schapker‘s lack of a prior criminal record, but it
nevertheless concluded that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and
declined to revise his twelve-year sentence. 58
In Hosler v. State,59 the court of appeals struck the victim‘s age as an
aggravator because her age was an element of the crime. 60 Nevertheless, it
concluded that the trial court‘s imposition of an enhanced three-year sentence
after Hosler pled guilty to battery was appropriate because of his criminal
history and his position of trust in relation to the victim.61
In Smith v. State, the court of appeals reviewed a sixty-four-year sentence
for three counts related to Smith‘s sexual conduct with a thirteen-year-old girl
and her teenage friend (class A child molesting, class B sexual misconduct,
class C sexual misconduct). 62 The court concluded that, in light of Smith‘s
lack of criminal history, 63 a maximum sentence on the class A felony was not

Estes v. State, 827 N.E.2d 27 (Ind. 2005) (per curiam) (267-year sentence for
convictions on fifteen counts of child molesting and related charges involving
two victims revised to 120 years (consecutive standard 30-year terms on four
counts, remaining terms concurrent)); Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852 (Ind.
2003) (385-year sentence for conviction on 26 counts of child molesting and
related charges involving one victim revised to 90 years (consecutive standard
30-year terms on three counts, remaining terms concurrent)); Ortiz v. State, 766
N.E.2d 370 (Ind. 2002) (60-year sentence for conviction on three counts of
child molesting involving one victim revised to 30 years (standard 30-year term
on one count, remaining terms concurrent; additional 30-year habitual offender
enhancement affirmed)); Walker v. State, 747 N.E.2d 536 (Ind. 2001) (80-year
sentence for two counts of child molesting involving one victim revised to 40
years (enhanced 40-year term on one count, remaining term concurrent)).
Id. at 264–65.
57. No. 55A05-0606-CR-338, slip op. at 6–8, 861 N.E.2d 390 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2007)
(unpublished table decision).
58. Id. at 8.
59. No. 35A02-0604-CR-358, slip op. at 8, 856 N.E.2d 790 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2006)
(unpublished table decision).
60. Id. at 3. Under IND. CODE § 35-42-1(a)(2)(B) (2000), battery is a Class D felony where the
victim is less than fourteen years old and the perpetrator is at least eighteen. In this case, the victim
was eleven years old at the time of the offense. Hosler, slip op. at 2.
61. Id. at 10.
62. No. 43A03-0607-CR-297, slip op. at 2, 863 N.E.2d 922 (Ind. Ct. App. March. 26, 2007)
(unpublished table decision).
63. During sentencing, the trial judge mentioned that he had presided over a similar trial in
which Smith was acquitted and stated:
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appropriate, and thus, the court revised his sentence to forty-four years.64
This, of course, happens regularly in the federal system, where appellate
courts increase sentences imposed by district courts. In fact, the United States
government may appeal a sentence where it was imposed in violation of law,
was imposed due to an incorrect application of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, is less than the Guidelines-specified minimum, or was imposed
for an offense without such guidelines and is plainly unreasonable. 65 A
defendant may only appeal an upward departure from the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, and the government may only appeal a downward departure. 66
Similarly, a federal appellate court cannot enter an increase of imprisonment
absent a government appeal or cross-appeal.67
V. THE MEANING OF THIS STORY
While it has always been difficult to persuade appellate courts to reduce a
criminal sentence, prisoners who have filed such appeals during the past five
or six years have experienced an environment decidedly more open than it had
been at any time since the 1970 constitutional amendment was adopted. Still,
prosecutors were prohibitive favorites in these encounters, and, moreover,
they won a potentially valuable doctrinal point in 2009. The supreme court
held in McCullough v. State that when a prisoner initiates a sentencing appeal,
the prosecution is entitled to argue for a more severe sentence, citing the same
1907 British act from the reign of Edward VII that began the whole
enterprise.68 A minority of the court argued against conditioning the state‘s
opportunity to seek a higher sentence on the defendant having sought a
reduction, saying defense counsel should not be forced to choose between
requesting sentence reduction and risking sentence enhancement. 69
[I]t is beyond me, Mr. Smith, how I could ever find that you have led a law
abiding life and have no history of delinquency or criminal activity. I don‘t buy
that. But let‘s say that you do have no history of criminal activity, I think given
the aggravating factors that I mentioned, it is so insignificant in the total scheme
of things that I wouldn‘t give it any weight anyway.
Smith, slip op. at 13.
64. Id. at 16. This was not the minimum sentence. The court stated: ―[W]e do not perceive that
the nature of the offenses and the character of the offender here suggest maximum and consecutive
sentences. However, these same considerations do not suggest a minimal sentence.‖ Id.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b) (2006).
66. United States v. Soltero-Lopez, 11 F.3d 18, 19 (1st Cir. 1993).
67. Greenlaw v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2559, 2562 (2008).
68. 900 N.E.2d 745, 748 (Ind. 2009) (citing Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23,
§ 4(3)).
69. Id. at 751–53 (Boehm, J., concurring). The changes in the British system along these lines
made a substantial difference in the number of prisoners who chose to appeal. When Parliament
briefly suspended the Court of Appeal‘s power to increase sentences, the number of sentencing
appeals nearly doubled. Thomas, supra note 11, at 223.
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The forty-year evolution of sentencing review reflects a substantial change
from a regime in which the appellate courts took cognizance only of
procedural error to one in which the appellate review is part of the sentencing
process. This is especially true with sentences of death and life without
parole. 70
While this alteration has led to additional relief from excessive sentences
(it hardly could have led to less relief), there are multiple factors that still
restrain the possibility of any significant further expansion in the number of
prevailing claimants. First, the absence of any global substantive framework
(like the federal Guidelines) makes it difficult for courts on appeal to perceive
when a given sentence deviates from the system-wide norm. Second, it seems
likely that if we knew what the system‘s norm was for a variety of
dispositions, we would find that the number of outliers warranting revision
will always be small. Put another way, trial courts get it right approximately
90% of the time on all criminal law issues, and it is unlikely that sentencing is
much different than the collection of other potential errors on which reversal
is often sought, such as search and seizure, jury instructions, and the like.
Third, the peculiar responsibility trial judges bear in their own communities
for sentencing will always lead appellate judges to exercise considerable
deference and restraint in review of sentencing decisions.
Indiana‘s appellate courts recognize these restraints and operate with
reasonable effectiveness within them. In any system of criminal justice that
sentences felons by the tens of thousands each year, there are bound to be
some whose penalty warrants modification. Indiana‘s use of the British idea
of ―review and revise‖71 attempts to identify those few and afford them relief.

70. Cooper v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1216, 1218 (Ind. 1989) (―[Indiana Supreme Court] review of
capital cases under article 7 is part and parcel of the sentencing process.‖); Brown v. State, 783
N.E.2d 1121, 1126–27 (Ind. 2003) (quoting the same sentence from Cooper in the context of a life
without parole case).
71. IND. CONST. art. VII, § 4.

